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If war really is an extension of politics by other means, as Carl von Clausewitz declared back in 1827, then few wars have served as better examples than the Secret War in Laos from 1961-1975. A clandestine conflict fought in parallel with the Vietnam War, the Laotian Secret War ostensibly set the United States, Thailand, and various Laotian factions against Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In practice, the conflict was as much a civil war as an invasion; and ultimately, it devolved into a slow-motion act of suicide on the part of the Lao nation itself. The U.S. military and its Laotian Hmong allies, led by the resourceful General Vang Pao, made a disciplined effort to prosecute the war—though from beginning to end, that effort was steeped in self-serving politics, and hamstrung by factional infighting, irrational decision-making, and self-imposed constraints that ultimately hurt more than they helped. Micromanagement by officers and clueless politicians far from the front was bad enough; far worse was the corruption of the head-butting Lao factions, who seemed unable to see beyond their own immediate needs and certainly had no vision for a strong, united Laos. The so-called Rightists, Leftists, and Neutralist factions simply could not wrap their heads around the concept that their only hope of survival lay in coming together against the relentless, well-equipped NVA. In fact, one faction, the Pathet Lao, repeatedly allied with the NVA against their own countrymen. But the Americans and Vang Pao's Hmong, those who repeatedly found themselves on the sharp end of the spear in the face of waffling, lack of discipline, and, occasionally, sheer cowardice on the part of their allies, refused to give up—until, finally, their political leadership turned their backs on them. This is the story of those brave men, and the civilians who helped them fight an increasingly painful and mismanaged war. It was a war in which the political leaders involved proved conclusively that they had learned nothing from history—or simply didn't care. Through ineptitude and back-room politicking, the leadership of both Laos and the United States eventually gave Laos to the Communists—who proceeded to crush the Lao people into the dust, in the name of a morally bankrupt ideology that they themselves neither practiced nor truly believed in. Billy G. Webb lays out their story with both great precision and compassion in this lively, well-researched book, outlining the events that led us into the morass of the Secret War, and then detailing each bloody campaign of each bloody year. In addition to following the key characters on the U.S./Laotian side, especially the charismatic Vang Pao, he peppers the story with tales of courageous individuals who fell victim to the NVA and the Pathet Lao—and, occasionally, the stupidity, incompetence, and gutlessness of people they trusted. Some survived to fight again; but many of these men, military and otherwise, paid the ultimate sacrifice in their fight to keep Laos free. Webb takes special care to showcase two organizations: the brave Forward Air Controllers who called themselves "the Ravens," and Air America, a civilian company (run by the CIA) that supported the military effort and aided the Lao populace whenever they were called upon. Few people have ever heard of the Ravens, those USAF and Army airmen who risked life and limb in tiny Cessna aircraft to locate targets for bombers and fighters to strike. Air America is more famous, due to the 1990 movie of the same name—a film that unfairly maligned Air America as a parcel service for Laotian powerbrokers moving drugs and gold out of the country. Webb sets the record emphatically straight. That's not to say that such things weren't happening in Laos; they were. In hindsight, it's easy to condemn the CIA and the U.S. military leadership for allowing the corruption to spread; but as Nietzsche has pointed out, when you look long into an abyss, the abyss looks into you. For similar reasons, some Americans felt that it was necessary to adopt the same illicit tactics the enemy was using against them. The repeatedly renegotiated Geneva Accords of 1952, in which various parties had agreed that Laos should be left to develop on its own without outside military intervention, were repeatedly and demonstrably violated by the NVA and its allies, the Russians and Chinese. Is it any wonder that, eventually, some Americans stepped over the line as well? Webb makes no excuses for the covert actions of the military, which "sheep-dipped" many of its soldiers as civilian development personnel; nor does he try to explain away the CIA's penchant to look the other way when corrupt Lao government officials and officers ignored their country's well-being while greedily lining their own pockets. In any case, lest we forget, opium trafficking—which underlay most of the corruption—was still legal in Laos during the war. Webb doesn’t attempt to make anyone in particular seem superhumanly noble, either—though his great respect for the servicemen and civilian personnel working in Laos does shine through. Nor does he demonize the bad guys. Even when discussing the NVA and its leadership, his reportage is even-handed and fair. He treats all the players as exactly what they were: human beings doing human things. Some were heroes; some were not. And speaking of heroes: not forgotten are the efforts of private citizens like Edgar "Pop" Buell, the crusty old volunteer who took the Laos branch of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by storm and, over the years, bettered the lives of many thousands, if not millions, of Laotians all over the tiny kingdom. Not only did Buell and his fellow USAID crusaders build schools and hospitals, they did all they could to shield the Lao from the worst effects of the war, and organized airlifts to remove them from danger zones whenever they could. Despite his diminutive size, Pop Buell stands as a shining example of the value and power of humanitarian efforts during wartime. Buell was one of the major players in the Secret War—and in the end, he and his colleagues may have helped the Lao people more than the military itself ended up doing. Unlike many war histories, Webb's story doesn't end abruptly with the implosion of the American war effort in Southeast Asia. In a lengthy epilog, he goes on to chronicle the creation of the doomed Provisional Government of National Union in post-war Laos, the abdication (and subsequent murder) of the royal family, the flight of the Hmong, and the gradual undermining of the government by the Communists, who refused to play fair even after the Secret War was over. He also makes no bones about the shabby treatment our Hmong allies received at the hands of our government after the war—including the recent arrest of Vang Pao and his lieutenants on weapons charges, in connection with their on-going efforts to revitalize Hmong resistance efforts in Laos. The singular thread that runs through the entire narrative and ties it all together is Webb's tremendous respect for the people who worked so hard to bring the Lao together and protect them from their NVA aggressors. Hmong, U.S. military, and CIA, they all worked at it unceasingly for more than fifteen years, and it's to their credit that it didn't all fall to pieces a good decade earlier than it did. That it was ultimately all for naught doesn't lessen the sacrifices of the civilians and soldiers who fought to keep Lao free. Billy Webb's book is a monument not only to his skills as a researcher and a writer, but also to the efforts of those brave individuals, many of whom came home in caskets—and some of whom still haven't come home.

If war really is an extension of politics by other means, as Carl von Clausewitz declared back in 1827, then few wars have served as better examples than the Secret War in Laos from 1961-1975. A clandestine conflict fought in parallel with the Vietnam War, the Laotian Secret War ostensibly set the United States, Thailand, and various Laotian factions against Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In practice, the conflict was as much a civil war as an invasion; and ultimately, it devolved into a slow-motion act of suicide on the part of the Lao nation itself. The U.S. military and its Laotian Hmong allies, led by the resourceful General Vang Pao, made a disciplined effort to prosecute the war—though from beginning to end, that effort was steeped in self-serving politics, and hamstrung by factional infighting, irrational decision-making, and self-imposed constraints that ultimately hurt more than they helped. Micromanagement by officers and clueless politicians far from the front was bad enough; far worse was the corruption of the head-butting Lao factions, who seemed unable to see beyond their own immediate needs and certainly had no vision for a strong, united Laos. The so-called Rightists, Leftists, and Neutralist factions simply could not wrap their heads around the concept that their only hope of survival lay in coming together against the relentless, well-equipped NVA. In fact, one faction, the Pathet Lao, repeatedly allied with the NVA against their own countrymen. But the Americans and Vang Pao's Hmong, those who repeatedly found themselves on the sharp end of the spear in the face of waffling, lack of discipline, and, occasionally, sheer cowardice on the part of their allies, refused to give up—until, finally, their political leadership turned their backs on them. This is the story of those brave men, and the civilians who helped them fight an increasingly painful and mismanaged war. It was a war in which the political leaders involved proved conclusively that they had learned nothing from history—or simply didn't care. Through ineptitude and back-room politicking, the leadership of both Laos and the United States eventually gave Laos to the Communists—who proceeded to crush the Lao people into the dust, in the name of a morally bankrupt ideology that they themselves neither practiced nor truly believed in. Billy G. Webb lays out their story with both great precision and compassion in this lively, well-researched book, outlining the events that led us into the morass of the Secret War, and then detailing each bloody campaign of each bloody year. In addition to following the key characters on the U.S./Laotian side, especially the charismatic Vang Pao, he peppers the story with tales of courageous individuals who fell victim to the NVA and the Pathet Lao—and, occasionally, the stupidity, incompetence, and gutlessness of people they trusted. Some survived to fight again; but many of these men, military and otherwise, paid the ultimate sacrifice in their fight to keep Laos free. Webb takes special care to showcase two organizations: the brave Forward Air Controllers who called themselves "the Ravens," and Air America, a civilian company (run by the CIA) that supported the military effort and aided the Lao populace whenever they were called upon. Few people have ever heard of the Ravens, those USAF and Army airmen who risked life and limb in tiny Cessna aircraft to locate targets for bombers and fighters to strike. Air America is more famous, due to the 1990 movie of the same name—a film that unfairly maligned Air America as a parcel service for Laotian powerbrokers moving drugs and gold out of the country. Webb sets the record emphatically straight. That's not to say that such things weren't happening in Laos; they were. In hindsight, it's easy to condemn the CIA and the U.S. military leadership for allowing the corruption to spread; but as Nietzsche has pointed out, when you look long into an abyss, the abyss looks into you. For similar reasons, some Americans felt that it was necessary to adopt the same illicit tactics the enemy was using against them. The repeatedly renegotiated Geneva Accords of 1952, in which various parties had agreed that Laos should be left to develop on its own without outside military intervention, were repeatedly and demonstrably violated by the NVA and its allies, the Russians and Chinese. Is it any wonder that, eventually, some Americans stepped over the line as well? Webb makes no excuses for the covert actions of the military, which "sheep-dipped" many of its soldiers as civilian development personnel; nor does he try to explain away the CIA's penchant to look the other way when corrupt Lao government officials and officers ignored their country's well-being while greedily lining their own pockets. In any case, lest we forget, opium trafficking—which underlay most of the corruption—was still legal in Laos during the war. Webb doesn’t attempt to make anyone in particular seem superhumanly noble, either—though his great respect for the servicemen and civilian personnel working in Laos does shine through. Nor does he demonize the bad guys. Even when discussing the NVA and its leadership, his reportage is even-handed and fair. He treats all the players as exactly what they were: human beings doing human things. Some were heroes; some were not. And speaking of heroes: not forgotten are the efforts of private citizens like Edgar "Pop" Buell, the crusty old volunteer who took the Laos branch of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by storm and, over the years, bettered the lives of many thousands, if not millions, of Laotians all over the tiny kingdom. Not only did Buell and his fellow USAID crusaders build schools and hospitals, they did all they could to shield the Lao from the worst effects of the war, and organized airlifts to remove them from danger zones whenever they could. Despite his diminutive size, Pop Buell stands as a shining example of the value and power of humanitarian efforts during wartime. Buell was one of the major players in the Secret War—and in the end, he and his colleagues may have helped the Lao people more than the military itself ended up doing. Unlike many war histories, Webb's story doesn't end abruptly with the implosion of the American war effort in Southeast Asia. In a lengthy epilog, he goes on to chronicle the creation of the doomed Provisional Government of National Union in post-war Laos, the abdication (and subsequent murder) of the royal family, the flight of the Hmong, and the gradual undermining of the government by the Communists, who refused to play fair even after the Secret War was over. He also makes no bones about the shabby treatment our Hmong allies received at the hands of our government after the war—including the recent arrest of Vang Pao and his lieutenants on weapons charges, in connection with their on-going efforts to revitalize Hmong resistance efforts in Laos. The singular thread that runs through the entire narrative and ties it all together is Webb's tremendous respect for the people who worked so hard to bring the Lao together and protect them from their NVA aggressors. Hmong, U.S. military, and CIA, they all worked at it unceasingly for more than fifteen years, and it's to their credit that it didn't all fall to pieces a good decade earlier than it did. That it was ultimately all for naught doesn't lessen the sacrifices of the civilians and soldiers who fought to keep Lao free. Billy Webb's book is a monument not only to his skills as a researcher and a writer, but also to the efforts of those brave individuals, many of whom came home in caskets—and some of whom still haven't come home.

If war really is an extension of politics by other means, as Carl von Clausewitz declared back in 1827, then few wars have served as better examples than the Secret War in Laos from 1961-1975. A clandestine conflict fought in parallel with the Vietnam War, the Laotian Secret War ostensibly set the United States, Thailand, and various Laotian factions against Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In practice, the conflict was as much a civil war as an invasion; and ultimately, it devolved into a slow-motion act of suicide on the part of the Lao nation itself. The U.S. military and its Laotian Hmong allies, led by the resourceful General Vang Pao, made a disciplined effort to prosecute the war—though from beginning to end, that effort was steeped in self-serving politics, and hamstrung by factional infighting, irrational decision-making, and self-imposed constraints that ultimately hurt more than they helped. Micromanagement by officers and clueless politicians far from the front was bad enough; far worse was the corruption of the head-butting Lao factions, who seemed unable to see beyond their own immediate needs and certainly had no vision for a strong, united Laos. The so-called Rightists, Leftists, and Neutralist factions simply could not wrap their heads around the concept that their only hope of survival lay in coming together against the relentless, well-equipped NVA. In fact, one faction, the Pathet Lao, repeatedly allied with the NVA against their own countrymen. But the Americans and Vang Pao's Hmong, those who repeatedly found themselves on the sharp end of the spear in the face of waffling, lack of discipline, and, occasionally, sheer cowardice on the part of their allies, refused to give up—until, finally, their political leadership turned their backs on them. This is the story of those brave men, and the civilians who helped them fight an increasingly painful and mismanaged war. It was a war in which the political leaders involved proved conclusively that they had learned nothing from history—or simply didn't care. Through ineptitude and back-room politicking, the leadership of both Laos and the United States eventually gave Laos to the Communists—who proceeded to crush the Lao people into the dust, in the name of a morally bankrupt ideology that they themselves neither practiced nor truly believed in. Billy G. Webb lays out their story with both great precision and compassion in this lively, well-researched book, outlining the events that led us into the morass of the Secret War, and then detailing each bloody campaign of each bloody year. In addition to following the key characters on the U.S./Laotian side, especially the charismatic Vang Pao, he peppers the story with tales of courageous individuals who fell victim to the NVA and the Pathet Lao—and, occasionally, the stupidity, incompetence, and gutlessness of people they trusted. Some survived to fight again; but many of these men, military and otherwise, paid the ultimate sacrifice in their fight to keep Laos free. Webb takes special care to showcase two organizations: the brave Forward Air Controllers who called themselves "the Ravens," and Air America, a civilian company (run by the CIA) that supported the military effort and aided the Lao populace whenever they were called upon. Few people have ever heard of the Ravens, those USAF and Army airmen who risked life and limb in tiny Cessna aircraft to locate targets for bombers and fighters to strike. Air America is more famous, due to the 1990 movie of the same name—a film that unfairly maligned Air America as a parcel service for Laotian powerbrokers moving drugs and gold out of the country. Webb sets the record emphatically straight. That's not to say that such things weren't happening in Laos; they were. In hindsight, it's easy to condemn the CIA and the U.S. military leadership for allowing the corruption to spread; but as Nietzsche has pointed out, when you look long into an abyss, the abyss looks into you. For similar reasons, some Americans felt that it was necessary to adopt the same illicit tactics the enemy was using against them. The repeatedly renegotiated Geneva Accords of 1952, in which various parties had agreed that Laos should be left to develop on its own without outside military intervention, were repeatedly and demonstrably violated by the NVA and its allies, the Russians and Chinese. Is it any wonder that, eventually, some Americans stepped over the line as well? Webb makes no excuses for the covert actions of the military, which "sheep-dipped" many of its soldiers as civilian development personnel; nor does he try to explain away the CIA's penchant to look the other way when corrupt Lao government officials and officers ignored their country's well-being while greedily lining their own pockets. In any case, lest we forget, opium trafficking—which underlay most of the corruption—was still legal in Laos during the war. Webb doesn’t attempt to make anyone in particular seem superhumanly noble, either—though his great respect for the servicemen and civilian personnel working in Laos does shine through. Nor does he demonize the bad guys. Even when discussing the NVA and its leadership, his reportage is even-handed and fair. He treats all the players as exactly what they were: human beings doing human things. Some were heroes; some were not. And speaking of heroes: not forgotten are the efforts of private citizens like Edgar "Pop" Buell, the crusty old volunteer who took the Laos branch of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by storm and, over the years, bettered the lives of many thousands, if not millions, of Laotians all over the tiny kingdom. Not only did Buell and his fellow USAID crusaders build schools and hospitals, they did all they could to shield the Lao from the worst effects of the war, and organized airlifts to remove them from danger zones whenever they could. Despite his diminutive size, Pop Buell stands as a shining example of the value and power of humanitarian efforts during wartime. Buell was one of the major players in the Secret War—and in the end, he and his colleagues may have helped the Lao people more than the military itself ended up doing. Unlike many war histories, Webb's story doesn't end abruptly with the implosion of the American war effort in Southeast Asia. In a lengthy epilog, he goes on to chronicle the creation of the doomed Provisional Government of National Union in post-war Laos, the abdication (and subsequent murder) of the royal family, the flight of the Hmong, and the gradual undermining of the government by the Communists, who refused to play fair even after the Secret War was over. He also makes no bones about the shabby treatment our Hmong allies received at the hands of our government after the war—including the recent arrest of Vang Pao and his lieutenants on weapons charges, in connection with their on-going efforts to revitalize Hmong resistance efforts in Laos. The singular thread that runs through the entire narrative and ties it all together is Webb's tremendous respect for the people who worked so hard to bring the Lao together and protect them from their NVA aggressors. Hmong, U.S. military, and CIA, they all worked at it unceasingly for more than fifteen years, and it's to their credit that it didn't all fall to pieces a good decade earlier than it did. That it was ultimately all for naught doesn't lessen the sacrifices of the civilians and soldiers who fought to keep Lao free. Billy Webb's book is a monument not only to his skills as a researcher and a writer, but also to the efforts of those brave individuals, many of whom came home in caskets—and some of whom still haven't come home.

No Description Available.

Dave Fennessy is a man who has worked in the Auto Industry at the dealership level his adult life. He has paid his share of taxes over the years and is frankly, disgusted with how these taxes are being spent. The Greed, dishonesty and sheer incompetence of our politicians is, in Dave’s opinion, a threat to the very existence of the United States of America as we know it. Tired of yelling at the Television, Dave points out the events of history to give us insight into solutions to this country’s problems. He feels that this next congressional election is crucial to the future of this country. This book is a wealth of information for patriotic Americans everywhere to gain the verbal advantage on issues that in many cases, won’t even be discussed by our government officials. Aside from pointing out things that always worked in the past and how they are no longer now, Dave points out some new ideas that are also never even talked about on thing like alternative energy development, re-building this country’s economy and protecting it’s citizens. He feels that unless new people are elected to congress that the all powerful lobbyists in this country will maintain their stranglehold on our government, and therefore our pathetic slide into socialism and political correctness will continue. A possible Tea Party platform is laid out at the end. Arm yourself with these ideas and facts and Enjoy!

Dave Fennessy is a man who has worked in the Auto Industry at the dealership level his adult life. He has paid his share of taxes over the years and is frankly, disgusted with how these taxes are being spent. The Greed, dishonesty and sheer incompetence of our politicians is, in Dave’s opinion, a threat to the very existence of the United States of America as we know it. Tired of yelling at the Television, Dave points out the events of history to give us insight into solutions to this country’s problems. He feels that this next congressional election is crucial to the future of this country. This book is a wealth of information for patriotic Americans everywhere to gain the verbal advantage on issues that in many cases, won’t even be discussed by our government officials. Aside from pointing out things that always worked in the past and how they are no longer now, Dave points out some new ideas that are also never even talked about on thing like alternative energy development, re-building this country’s economy and protecting it’s citizens. He feels that unless new people are elected to congress that the all powerful lobbyists in this country will maintain their stranglehold on our government, and therefore our pathetic slide into socialism and political correctness will continue. A possible Tea Party platform is laid out at the end. Arm yourself with these ideas and facts and Enjoy!

Dave Fennessy is a man who has worked in the Auto Industry at the dealership level his adult life. He has paid his share of taxes over the years and is frankly, disgusted with how these taxes are being spent. The Greed, dishonesty and sheer incompetence of our politicians is, in Dave’s opinion, a threat to the very existence of the United States of America as we know it. Tired of yelling at the Television, Dave points out the events of history to give us insight into solutions to this country’s problems. He feels that this next congressional election is crucial to the future of this country. This book is a wealth of information for patriotic Americans everywhere to gain the verbal advantage on issues that in many cases, won’t even be discussed by our government officials. Aside from pointing out things that always worked in the past and how they are no longer now, Dave points out some new ideas that are also never even talked about on thing like alternative energy development, re-building this country’s economy and protecting it’s citizens. He feels that unless new people are elected to congress that the all powerful lobbyists in this country will maintain their stranglehold on our government, and therefore our pathetic slide into socialism and political correctness will continue. A possible Tea Party platform is laid out at the end. Arm yourself with these ideas and facts and Enjoy!

The Thin Green Line: From Intractable Problems to Feasible Solutions in the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict
by Leon S. Sheleff

This book is an attempt to offer an understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict froman Israeli perspective, one that is critical of official Israeli policy and conventional Israeli thinking. It presents a more comprehensive analysis of the key issues than that contained in most standard accounts, as well as a more optimistic approach than that emanating from most governmental statements and a more comprehensive picture than that reflected in President George W. Bush’s “road-map”.

In fact, the book opens with the suggestion that a road-map is too limited and one-dimensional to handle the many facets of the issue, and suggests the need for an “atlas”, conjuring up the idea of a fuller confrontation with the most controversial issues, instead of the continual efforts to avoid an honest assessment of these issues. The intractable problems, discussed in separate chapters, are:

- The status of Jerusalem;
- The fate of the Palestinian refugees;
- The question of Jewish settlement in the occupied territories.

It is suggested that the basic issues are often obfuscated by inaccurate descriptions anddefinitions. For example, the sentimental attachment of the Jewish people to Jerusalem can be easily accommodated within a divided city, since the boundaries of the city have beenarbitrarily drawn, covering an immense geographical area with no meaningful overlap with biblical sites. The political machinations and intricacies are described in detail, and an explanation is given as to how Jerusalem can be fairly divided between the two separate states of Israel and Palestine.

From the Israeli point of view, the major problem is neither the division of Jerusalem nor the Palestinian claim for a right of return, but the fate of the hundreds of thousands of Israelis (constituting 5-10% of the Jewish population of Israel) who live beyond the pre-1967 border known as the Green Line.

The author claims that Israel’s present predicament is a direct result of the reckless and arrogant manner in which Jewish settlements were set up on the West Bank and in Gaza, creating friction with the local population, deep divisions within the Israeli social and political system, and a serious impediment to any peace process. The settlements, the author argues, are a consequence of short-sighted political planning, linked to ideological and religious zeal, which, unfortunately, were sanctioned by Israel’s Supreme Court, despite the reasoned claims that the settlement policy was in violation of the Geneva Convention.

The book suggests new, humane solutions for both the Jewish settlers and the Palestinian refugees.

* * *
Going beyond the problematics of the conflict, the book offers original approaches to the future interaction between Israel and Palestine. The many diverse contacts between the two nations, living in a confined space formally delimited by the British Mandate, provides a basis for a confederative structure. Such a framework would be a loose one in its initial stages, so as to allow for the gradual building of trust and confidence.

A long list of problems, from environmental damage to water shortage, requires the maximum amount of cooperation between both countries. Confederation also poses the possibility of a novel solution for Jerusalem, which would be divided and then re-united. East Jerusalem would be the capital of Palestine, to be known by its Arab name, El Kuds, while West Jerusalem would be the capital of Israel, to be known by its Hebrew name, Yerushalayim. Both halves together would be the capital of the confederation and called Jerusalem. This city, now peaceful and stable, would then be accorded special status as the center of international organizations, much as Geneva, The Hague and Brussels are today. As a religious center for the three monotheistic religions, it would have a special attraction, further enhanced by its geographic location in Asia. Special arrangements would be made for the Old City and the Temple Mount, which are holy to all three religions.

The present intifada was touched off by violence on the Temple Mount: five Moslems were killed by Israeli police attempting to control a crowd that was demonstrating against the visit on the previous day by the then leader of the parliamentary opposition, Arik Sharon. At the time the site was still open to non-Moslem visitors, but the presence of Sharon, accompanied by nearly one-half of his parliamentary faction, and attended by hundreds of policemen and secret service agents, was seen as a deliberate provocation. It had been publicly announced as a gesture proving Israel’s sovereignty over the site, and was exposed to wide media coverage. As a result of the ensuing violence, the Wakf, the Islamic authority governing the Temple Mount, closed the site to non-Moslems.

This incident is meticulously examined, and some possible hidden motivations and political machinations are explored. Its link to other violent eruptions and security matters are also discussed, including the implications of the murder of 29 Moslem worshippers at Hebron by a Jewish settler, the assassination of Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin by a right-wing Jewish extremist, and the massacre of Moslems by Christian militia in Sabra and Shatila during the Israeli incursion into Lebanon.

The book suggests that a true peace can only be attained by a commitment to a shared future, in which the basic thrust for peace emanates from the local leadership of Israelis and Palestinians, and is not imposed by outsiders, however well-intentioned. This is a major drawback of the road-map, and is the reason for proposing a broader and more comprehensive atlas, which not only deals with immediate problems but incorporates larger concepts of reconciliation. This could be achieved by a tribunal similar to the Commissions of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, and/or by a museum, which would show the injuries inflicted by both sides, would be dedicated to a deep process of reconciliation, and would, symbolically, be situated astride the Green Line.

The Green Line as an international boundary has been breached. It needs to be restored to signify the political integrity of two independent states. But it must not be seen as a physical barrier, but as a symbolic bridge of fruitful cooperation between the two nations.