ADAMANT AGGRESSORS is a practical guide to help scholars, political scientists, policy-makers and laymen understand and apply specific lessons that history has for the present time. It takes a business-case look at five adamant aggressors - Mehmed the Conqueror, James K. Polk, Adolph Hitler, Chaim Weizmann/David Ben-Gurion, Joseph Stalin - and what they teach about recognizing and dealing with adamant aggressors who may be threatening America today. While these lessons may not ensure that the best choices will be made today, understanding them will help readers to reject demonstrated bad choices and, thus, more likely arrive at better choices. This unique approach allows readers to quickly peruse a 2-3 page Executive Summary at the beginning of each case study, or to examine a thoroughly researched and documented narrative of the aggressor�s action and the reactions of his targets. Analysis then details how each aggressor is identified as adamant (and might have been while there was time to react effectively), and how targets violated or sometimes conformed to guidelines for dealing with adamant aggressors. The final chapter draws from the five cases to validate the lessons for how to recognize and deal with adamant aggressors, and urges application by America´s leaders. USA "Best Books 2011" awards - Finalist in the "Current Events: Political/Social" category.

ADAMANT AGGRESSORS is a practical guide to help scholars, political scientists, policy-makers and laymen understand and apply specific lessons that history has for the present time. It takes a business-case look at five adamant aggressors - Mehmed the Conqueror, James K. Polk, Adolph Hitler, Chaim Weizmann/David Ben-Gurion, Joseph Stalin - and what they teach about recognizing and dealing with adamant aggressors who may be threatening America today. While these lessons may not ensure that the best choices will be made today, understanding them will help readers to reject demonstrated bad choices and, thus, more likely arrive at better choices. This unique approach allows readers to quickly peruse a 2-3 page Executive Summary at the beginning of each case study, or to examine a thoroughly researched and documented narrative of the aggressor�s action and the reactions of his targets. Analysis then details how each aggressor is identified as adamant (and might have been while there was time to react effectively), and how targets violated or sometimes conformed to guidelines for dealing with adamant aggressors. The final chapter draws from the five cases to validate the lessons for how to recognize and deal with adamant aggressors, and urges application by America´s leaders. USA "Best Books 2011" awards - Finalist in the "Current Events: Political/Social" category.

ADAMANT AGGRESSORS is a practical guide to help scholars, political scientists, policy-makers and laymen understand and apply specific lessons that history has for the present time. It takes a business-case look at five adamant aggressors - Mehmed the Conqueror, James K. Polk, Adolph Hitler, Chaim Weizmann/David Ben-Gurion, Joseph Stalin - and what they teach about recognizing and dealing with adamant aggressors who may be threatening America today. While these lessons may not ensure that the best choices will be made today, understanding them will help readers to reject demonstrated bad choices and, thus, more likely arrive at better choices. This unique approach allows readers to quickly peruse a 2-3 page Executive Summary at the beginning of each case study, or to examine a thoroughly researched and documented narrative of the aggressor�s action and the reactions of his targets. Analysis then details how each aggressor is identified as adamant (and might have been while there was time to react effectively), and how targets violated or sometimes conformed to guidelines for dealing with adamant aggressors. The final chapter draws from the five cases to validate the lessons for how to recognize and deal with adamant aggressors, and urges application by America´s leaders. USA "Best Books 2011" awards - Finalist in the "Current Events: Political/Social" category.

Two terms, closely related, are often used as synonyms but it is important to keep the distinction between them always in mind. The meaning of “national security” is clear enough—it means how safe are we as a nation? It is not always easy to give an accurate answer to that question but we know what we are trying to assess. “National strategy,” on the other hand, refers to how we seek to be secure. It frequently is the subject of great, continuous, and emotional debate and little about it can be taken for granted. This book examines the security of the United States from the perspective of the strategy we have followed at various times. Because if things are not working out right, it will be because our ideas about how to be secure, and what we need to do about it, need adjusting. In the aftermath of our wounding experience in Vietnam, the second war with Iraq, and the later phase of the Afghanistan War, we are at a point where we seriously need to consider that we have been doing wrong. Embarking on a war is always a very risky thing. If a nation is attacked, it has little option; it must either respond with force or surrender. But going to war is often a matter of choice. No decision a nation can make compares in importance with this one. It is not just that war inevitably brings destruction and bloodshed in its train. War turns individual lives upside down. For the nation as a whole it means facing the sobering fact that whatever ability you previously had to unilaterally control your national fate, is now abandoned. You have entered a very dicey partnership to inflict mutual destruction. No matter if you have a neat set of war plans which are designed to get you in the fighting where you want to go at minimum cost. Your enemy will have other plans, and they will enter into and distort the equation. So the most important consideration when making the decision to go to war is to be as absolutely sure as you can be that you really need to do it. “Is this war really necessary?” should be printed at the top of all congressional and White House stationery. It is the prime question to which all analyses of national security must be addressed from the perspective of grand strategy. It might be supposed that so solemn a decision as that of going to war would only be taken after much thought and examination both of alternatives and of the likely course of events, given a range of scenarios. Nothing could be farther from the actuality. That is emphatically not how the United States goes to war. Obviously, for anyone to question whether war is really necessary or even desirable requires a cool head in a time when the discussion is highly likely to be very heated. Yet if rational considerations are abandoned, we get whatever comes of it, good, bad, or worse. That there are rational considerations for judging the desirability and feasibility of a war should not be doubted, just because they are so often not taken seriously or fully into account. We shall have much to say about what they are as we go on. A second obvious (but easily overlooked) consideration is to have some plan for ending a war, once begun. When the leaders of the Japanese government decided in mid-1941 that war with the United States was inevitable, they planned the Pearl Harbor attack. While from America’s point of view it was a sneak and unprovoked attack, from a military point of view it was a brilliant initial move. But the Japanese did not have the resources to invade the continental United States and subdue it. So, having begun well, the Japanese had no real hopes of achieving the aims that had inspired the attack. Unless they could count on America’s nerves and will being so undermined by the Pearl Harbor attack that the United States would seek a negotiated peace. If they had initially done a careful assessment of the American character and history, they would have quickly realized that the United States was not likely to react by giving up. The record of the United States on how to end involvement in a conflict would not earn top honors either. Fortunately, America has not had to pay the price the Japanese had to pay because America did not lose that war. But, as we shall see, in its later wars the United States never had a clear notion of how to disengage. A third and fairly obvious consideration, at a time when there is a serious prospect of going to war, is the state of the nation’s defenses, especially the condition and deployment of its armed forces. When President Theodore Roosevelt, never one to mince words, wrote his autobiography, he entitled chapter VII “The war of America the Unready.” He wrote: “I expect the United States will always be unready for war, and in consequence will always be exposed to great expense, and to the possibility of the greatest calamity, when the nation goes to war. This is no new thing. Americans learn only from catastrophes and not from experience.” Another hundred years and a number of wars later, we see that he was both right and wrong. Back in the 1930s, when the United States was maintaining pitifully small ready forces, not a few people in and out of the Congress of the United States thought that that was exactly what was needed. Otherwise, given available force, the leaders of the country would take us into unneeded or only marginally necessary wars. That sentiment makes ironic reading today. For, unfortunately, what they feared has in the opinion of many come to pass. In the last decades America has become enmeshed in Middle Eastern affairs for which its own culture ill prepares it and without much consideration of the long-range consequences of its actions. Any of the isolationists of the 1930s who opposed entering World War II would be absolutely astonished at what the United States did following that war. Although they lost out on making their case back then, they would hardly have thought that America would reverse a long-standing policy of unilateralism. Not by any stretch of imagination would they have envisioned the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the two invasions of Iraq, and the war in Afghanistan. That is a lot of involvement, especially for a nation that thinks of itself as peace loving. If all of these wars had ended with a sense of popular approval, a vote of “well done,” there would be no need for a book of this sort. It would show that, although new to so much recurrent fighting, the United States had mastered the techniques so necessary to measure the costs and risks of armed encounters. Unfortunately, that is far from the truth…. “National strategy” is about what we decide when we look at the big picture about the world outside our shores and consider how we should respond to it. On this scale of analysis it is often called “grand strategy.” However subjective or objective our appraisal, our reaction to what we see begins from a concept. It reflects some idea of how what we see fits together and what that means or implies for the United States from a security point of view. It leads on to weighing alternative courses of action and an estimate of the probable costs against the likely gains or losses. Such analysis depends on mature judgment and a considerable knowledge of the pertinent facts. It must especially include appropriate allowances for how different cultures will react in different circumstances. So it is analysis that knows what facts are pertinent, and examines various likely scenarios within that context. Of this listing of what is involved in creating a prudent and effective strategy, two things stand out as most important. The first is the concept or idea in the heads of the decision makers as they begin their analysis. The other is taking into account the effects of different cultures as nations react to their problems. In the United States at the present time the most structured approach to national security problems and grand strategy is to be found in the specialized units created for this study as part of the war colleges or in the Pentagon itself. Its most formal form is called “war gaming.” And although it is called a game, it is a much more serious activity than the name implies. The Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, was the first American institution to make gaming a regular part of its activity. For the most important games, senior officials, military and civilian, come to play the various roles that the scenario calls for. These games, once concluded and studied, are used for the creation of contingency plans to be available as needed for deployments. Such gaming is not perfect as a means of discovering what is involved in any potential confrontation. They are excellent for showing how intelligent men and women on either side will react to the moves of the opponents. But, inevitably, cultural biases will enter in. Americans playing Americans is not the same as Americans playing Chinese or Russians or anyone else. Yet it does teach lessons, particularly of a logistics sort. Usually the scenarios used in these games place the players at the outset of the game in a crisis situation that most often will turn into war. That is understandable but it means that the decisions that led up to the crisis will not get maximum attention. Yet it is there that grand strategic analysis can be the most useful. Few American presidents have had an adequate background in grand strategic analysis when they took office although several have proved quick learners….

Two terms, closely related, are often used as synonyms but it is important to keep the distinction between them always in mind. The meaning of “national security” is clear enough—it means how safe are we as a nation? It is not always easy to give an accurate answer to that question but we know what we are trying to assess. “National strategy,” on the other hand, refers to how we seek to be secure. It frequently is the subject of great, continuous, and emotional debate and little about it can be taken for granted. This book examines the security of the United States from the perspective of the strategy we have followed at various times. Because if things are not working out right, it will be because our ideas about how to be secure, and what we need to do about it, need adjusting. In the aftermath of our wounding experience in Vietnam, the second war with Iraq, and the later phase of the Afghanistan War, we are at a point where we seriously need to consider that we have been doing wrong. Embarking on a war is always a very risky thing. If a nation is attacked, it has little option; it must either respond with force or surrender. But going to war is often a matter of choice. No decision a nation can make compares in importance with this one. It is not just that war inevitably brings destruction and bloodshed in its train. War turns individual lives upside down. For the nation as a whole it means facing the sobering fact that whatever ability you previously had to unilaterally control your national fate, is now abandoned. You have entered a very dicey partnership to inflict mutual destruction. No matter if you have a neat set of war plans which are designed to get you in the fighting where you want to go at minimum cost. Your enemy will have other plans, and they will enter into and distort the equation. So the most important consideration when making the decision to go to war is to be as absolutely sure as you can be that you really need to do it. “Is this war really necessary?” should be printed at the top of all congressional and White House stationery. It is the prime question to which all analyses of national security must be addressed from the perspective of grand strategy. It might be supposed that so solemn a decision as that of going to war would only be taken after much thought and examination both of alternatives and of the likely course of events, given a range of scenarios. Nothing could be farther from the actuality. That is emphatically not how the United States goes to war. Obviously, for anyone to question whether war is really necessary or even desirable requires a cool head in a time when the discussion is highly likely to be very heated. Yet if rational considerations are abandoned, we get whatever comes of it, good, bad, or worse. That there are rational considerations for judging the desirability and feasibility of a war should not be doubted, just because they are so often not taken seriously or fully into account. We shall have much to say about what they are as we go on. A second obvious (but easily overlooked) consideration is to have some plan for ending a war, once begun. When the leaders of the Japanese government decided in mid-1941 that war with the United States was inevitable, they planned the Pearl Harbor attack. While from America’s point of view it was a sneak and unprovoked attack, from a military point of view it was a brilliant initial move. But the Japanese did not have the resources to invade the continental United States and subdue it. So, having begun well, the Japanese had no real hopes of achieving the aims that had inspired the attack. Unless they could count on America’s nerves and will being so undermined by the Pearl Harbor attack that the United States would seek a negotiated peace. If they had initially done a careful assessment of the American character and history, they would have quickly realized that the United States was not likely to react by giving up. The record of the United States on how to end involvement in a conflict would not earn top honors either. Fortunately, America has not had to pay the price the Japanese had to pay because America did not lose that war. But, as we shall see, in its later wars the United States never had a clear notion of how to disengage. A third and fairly obvious consideration, at a time when there is a serious prospect of going to war, is the state of the nation’s defenses, especially the condition and deployment of its armed forces. When President Theodore Roosevelt, never one to mince words, wrote his autobiography, he entitled chapter VII “The war of America the Unready.” He wrote: “I expect the United States will always be unready for war, and in consequence will always be exposed to great expense, and to the possibility of the greatest calamity, when the nation goes to war. This is no new thing. Americans learn only from catastrophes and not from experience.” Another hundred years and a number of wars later, we see that he was both right and wrong. Back in the 1930s, when the United States was maintaining pitifully small ready forces, not a few people in and out of the Congress of the United States thought that that was exactly what was needed. Otherwise, given available force, the leaders of the country would take us into unneeded or only marginally necessary wars. That sentiment makes ironic reading today. For, unfortunately, what they feared has in the opinion of many come to pass. In the last decades America has become enmeshed in Middle Eastern affairs for which its own culture ill prepares it and without much consideration of the long-range consequences of its actions. Any of the isolationists of the 1930s who opposed entering World War II would be absolutely astonished at what the United States did following that war. Although they lost out on making their case back then, they would hardly have thought that America would reverse a long-standing policy of unilateralism. Not by any stretch of imagination would they have envisioned the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the two invasions of Iraq, and the war in Afghanistan. That is a lot of involvement, especially for a nation that thinks of itself as peace loving. If all of these wars had ended with a sense of popular approval, a vote of “well done,” there would be no need for a book of this sort. It would show that, although new to so much recurrent fighting, the United States had mastered the techniques so necessary to measure the costs and risks of armed encounters. Unfortunately, that is far from the truth…. “National strategy” is about what we decide when we look at the big picture about the world outside our shores and consider how we should respond to it. On this scale of analysis it is often called “grand strategy.” However subjective or objective our appraisal, our reaction to what we see begins from a concept. It reflects some idea of how what we see fits together and what that means or implies for the United States from a security point of view. It leads on to weighing alternative courses of action and an estimate of the probable costs against the likely gains or losses. Such analysis depends on mature judgment and a considerable knowledge of the pertinent facts. It must especially include appropriate allowances for how different cultures will react in different circumstances. So it is analysis that knows what facts are pertinent, and examines various likely scenarios within that context. Of this listing of what is involved in creating a prudent and effective strategy, two things stand out as most important. The first is the concept or idea in the heads of the decision makers as they begin their analysis. The other is taking into account the effects of different cultures as nations react to their problems. In the United States at the present time the most structured approach to national security problems and grand strategy is to be found in the specialized units created for this study as part of the war colleges or in the Pentagon itself. Its most formal form is called “war gaming.” And although it is called a game, it is a much more serious activity than the name implies. The Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, was the first American institution to make gaming a regular part of its activity. For the most important games, senior officials, military and civilian, come to play the various roles that the scenario calls for. These games, once concluded and studied, are used for the creation of contingency plans to be available as needed for deployments. Such gaming is not perfect as a means of discovering what is involved in any potential confrontation. They are excellent for showing how intelligent men and women on either side will react to the moves of the opponents. But, inevitably, cultural biases will enter in. Americans playing Americans is not the same as Americans playing Chinese or Russians or anyone else. Yet it does teach lessons, particularly of a logistics sort. Usually the scenarios used in these games place the players at the outset of the game in a crisis situation that most often will turn into war. That is understandable but it means that the decisions that led up to the crisis will not get maximum attention. Yet it is there that grand strategic analysis can be the most useful. Few American presidents have had an adequate background in grand strategic analysis when they took office although several have proved quick learners….

Two terms, closely related, are often used as synonyms but it is important to keep the distinction between them always in mind. The meaning of “national security” is clear enough—it means how safe are we as a nation? It is not always easy to give an accurate answer to that question but we know what we are trying to assess. “National strategy,” on the other hand, refers to how we seek to be secure. It frequently is the subject of great, continuous, and emotional debate and little about it can be taken for granted. This book examines the security of the United States from the perspective of the strategy we have followed at various times. Because if things are not working out right, it will be because our ideas about how to be secure, and what we need to do about it, need adjusting. In the aftermath of our wounding experience in Vietnam, the second war with Iraq, and the later phase of the Afghanistan War, we are at a point where we seriously need to consider that we have been doing wrong. Embarking on a war is always a very risky thing. If a nation is attacked, it has little option; it must either respond with force or surrender. But going to war is often a matter of choice. No decision a nation can make compares in importance with this one. It is not just that war inevitably brings destruction and bloodshed in its train. War turns individual lives upside down. For the nation as a whole it means facing the sobering fact that whatever ability you previously had to unilaterally control your national fate, is now abandoned. You have entered a very dicey partnership to inflict mutual destruction. No matter if you have a neat set of war plans which are designed to get you in the fighting where you want to go at minimum cost. Your enemy will have other plans, and they will enter into and distort the equation. So the most important consideration when making the decision to go to war is to be as absolutely sure as you can be that you really need to do it. “Is this war really necessary?” should be printed at the top of all congressional and White House stationery. It is the prime question to which all analyses of national security must be addressed from the perspective of grand strategy. It might be supposed that so solemn a decision as that of going to war would only be taken after much thought and examination both of alternatives and of the likely course of events, given a range of scenarios. Nothing could be farther from the actuality. That is emphatically not how the United States goes to war. Obviously, for anyone to question whether war is really necessary or even desirable requires a cool head in a time when the discussion is highly likely to be very heated. Yet if rational considerations are abandoned, we get whatever comes of it, good, bad, or worse. That there are rational considerations for judging the desirability and feasibility of a war should not be doubted, just because they are so often not taken seriously or fully into account. We shall have much to say about what they are as we go on. A second obvious (but easily overlooked) consideration is to have some plan for ending a war, once begun. When the leaders of the Japanese government decided in mid-1941 that war with the United States was inevitable, they planned the Pearl Harbor attack. While from America’s point of view it was a sneak and unprovoked attack, from a military point of view it was a brilliant initial move. But the Japanese did not have the resources to invade the continental United States and subdue it. So, having begun well, the Japanese had no real hopes of achieving the aims that had inspired the attack. Unless they could count on America’s nerves and will being so undermined by the Pearl Harbor attack that the United States would seek a negotiated peace. If they had initially done a careful assessment of the American character and history, they would have quickly realized that the United States was not likely to react by giving up. The record of the United States on how to end involvement in a conflict would not earn top honors either. Fortunately, America has not had to pay the price the Japanese had to pay because America did not lose that war. But, as we shall see, in its later wars the United States never had a clear notion of how to disengage. A third and fairly obvious consideration, at a time when there is a serious prospect of going to war, is the state of the nation’s defenses, especially the condition and deployment of its armed forces. When President Theodore Roosevelt, never one to mince words, wrote his autobiography, he entitled chapter VII “The war of America the Unready.” He wrote: “I expect the United States will always be unready for war, and in consequence will always be exposed to great expense, and to the possibility of the greatest calamity, when the nation goes to war. This is no new thing. Americans learn only from catastrophes and not from experience.” Another hundred years and a number of wars later, we see that he was both right and wrong. Back in the 1930s, when the United States was maintaining pitifully small ready forces, not a few people in and out of the Congress of the United States thought that that was exactly what was needed. Otherwise, given available force, the leaders of the country would take us into unneeded or only marginally necessary wars. That sentiment makes ironic reading today. For, unfortunately, what they feared has in the opinion of many come to pass. In the last decades America has become enmeshed in Middle Eastern affairs for which its own culture ill prepares it and without much consideration of the long-range consequences of its actions. Any of the isolationists of the 1930s who opposed entering World War II would be absolutely astonished at what the United States did following that war. Although they lost out on making their case back then, they would hardly have thought that America would reverse a long-standing policy of unilateralism. Not by any stretch of imagination would they have envisioned the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the two invasions of Iraq, and the war in Afghanistan. That is a lot of involvement, especially for a nation that thinks of itself as peace loving. If all of these wars had ended with a sense of popular approval, a vote of “well done,” there would be no need for a book of this sort. It would show that, although new to so much recurrent fighting, the United States had mastered the techniques so necessary to measure the costs and risks of armed encounters. Unfortunately, that is far from the truth…. “National strategy” is about what we decide when we look at the big picture about the world outside our shores and consider how we should respond to it. On this scale of analysis it is often called “grand strategy.” However subjective or objective our appraisal, our reaction to what we see begins from a concept. It reflects some idea of how what we see fits together and what that means or implies for the United States from a security point of view. It leads on to weighing alternative courses of action and an estimate of the probable costs against the likely gains or losses. Such analysis depends on mature judgment and a considerable knowledge of the pertinent facts. It must especially include appropriate allowances for how different cultures will react in different circumstances. So it is analysis that knows what facts are pertinent, and examines various likely scenarios within that context. Of this listing of what is involved in creating a prudent and effective strategy, two things stand out as most important. The first is the concept or idea in the heads of the decision makers as they begin their analysis. The other is taking into account the effects of different cultures as nations react to their problems. In the United States at the present time the most structured approach to national security problems and grand strategy is to be found in the specialized units created for this study as part of the war colleges or in the Pentagon itself. Its most formal form is called “war gaming.” And although it is called a game, it is a much more serious activity than the name implies. The Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, was the first American institution to make gaming a regular part of its activity. For the most important games, senior officials, military and civilian, come to play the various roles that the scenario calls for. These games, once concluded and studied, are used for the creation of contingency plans to be available as needed for deployments. Such gaming is not perfect as a means of discovering what is involved in any potential confrontation. They are excellent for showing how intelligent men and women on either side will react to the moves of the opponents. But, inevitably, cultural biases will enter in. Americans playing Americans is not the same as Americans playing Chinese or Russians or anyone else. Yet it does teach lessons, particularly of a logistics sort. Usually the scenarios used in these games place the players at the outset of the game in a crisis situation that most often will turn into war. That is understandable but it means that the decisions that led up to the crisis will not get maximum attention. Yet it is there that grand strategic analysis can be the most useful. Few American presidents have had an adequate background in grand strategic analysis when they took office although several have proved quick learners….

“The greatest threat to the U.S.’s homeland security is not a terrorist attack with a dirty bomb; it is an unexpected nuclear Pearl Harbor.” —author “Taiwan’s democratic achievement and vision of the future . . . are consistent with the American experience. Will Beijing eventually follow such a course? Decisions are still to be made, and there are limits to how effectively the U.S. can influence these decisions. But we can and we must continue to support Taiwan. Its security is ultimately our security. Of that we can be sure.” —the late Congressman Gerald B. H. Solomon Lí explains how America’s security hinges on Taiwan’s survival as an independent democracy.

“The greatest threat to the U.S.’s homeland security is not a terrorist attack with a dirty bomb; it is an unexpected nuclear Pearl Harbor.” —author “Taiwan’s democratic achievement and vision of the future . . . are consistent with the American experience. Will Beijing eventually follow such a course? Decisions are still to be made, and there are limits to how effectively the U.S. can influence these decisions. But we can and we must continue to support Taiwan. Its security is ultimately our security. Of that we can be sure.” —the late Congressman Gerald B. H. Solomon Lí explains how America’s security hinges on Taiwan’s survival as an independent democracy.

“The greatest threat to the U.S.’s homeland security is not a terrorist attack with a dirty bomb; it is an unexpected nuclear Pearl Harbor.” —author “Taiwan’s democratic achievement and vision of the future . . . are consistent with the American experience. Will Beijing eventually follow such a course? Decisions are still to be made, and there are limits to how effectively the U.S. can influence these decisions. But we can and we must continue to support Taiwan. Its security is ultimately our security. Of that we can be sure.” —the late Congressman Gerald B. H. Solomon Lí explains how America’s security hinges on Taiwan’s survival as an independent democracy.

“Walking the Plank: To a Dhimmi Nation” reveals how America has been systematically submitting to Islam for decades as American businessmen and politicians endorse Islamic causes in exchange for oil, money, and power.

Mary Christina Love describes Islam as a Russian Doll, with each victory leading to a larger victory. She shows how Islam is exerting increasing influence on America through immigration, oil economics, cultural exchange, education, political correctness, financial contributions, and the threat of terror; with 9/11 instrumental in enabling Islamic expansion in the United States by destroying evidence of who the world’s real imperialists are, and affording Muslims an affront to feel aggrieved and demand special protection status.

Cohorts in what could result in the largest coup d´état ever, Globalists and Islamists are allies that use a potpourri of tactics to eliminate Capitalism and Democracy to create a one-world government. The global warming theory, the recent financial crisis, the bailout, cap and trade, and the health care plan will establish a framework that if successful, will ultimately drive America into generations of dhimmitude.

Mary Christina Love describes dhimmitude, a pacifist reaction to aggression, as submission to Islamic demands resulting from cowardice, vulnerability, bribery and extortion. A dhimmi is a non-Muslim entity that accepts the conditions of Islamic law and remains safe by surrendering to Islamic terms. She provides current, and historical examples such as the Barbary Wars, to show how America is submitting to Islam through concession and appeasement under coercion and constant fear of reprisal.

If you think the price of gasoline at the pumps is outrageous these days, wait a few years until “The Tragedy of the Commons” really sets in.

“Whatever, the twists and turns in global politics, whatever the ebb of imperial power and the flow of national pride, one trend in the decades following World War II progressed in a straight and rapidly ascending line- the consumption of oil. If it can be said, in the abstract, that the sun energized the planet, it was oil that now powered its human population, both in its familiar forms as fuel and in the proliferation of new petrochemical products. Oil emerged triumphant, the undisputed King, a monarch garbed in a dazzling array of plastics. He was generous to his loyal subjects, sharing his wealth to and beyond the point of waste. His reign was a time of confidence, of growth, of expansion, of astonishing economic performance. His largesse transformed his kingdom, ushering in a new drive-in civilization. It was the Age of Hydrocarbon Man.”

So wrote Daniel Yergin in THE PRIZE: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, Joseph Stanislaw (Contributor): Touchstone, 1993.

“The Boys at Bohemian Grove” is a story about secret societies of powerful and influential men who meet in camera to sculpt world politics and design foreign policy.

In a world with alarmingly declining stores of fossil fuels, two American presidents place their positions of power, their fortunes, reputations, and their lives in great jeopardy, as they commit the armed forces of the greatest Superpower of all time to fight an imperial war for oil.

The goal: to perpetuate the contemporary life style of modern man; to stabilize American and other capitalist economies facing compromise by the rapid depletion of the world’s most precious natural resource; and to maintain world peace.

The novel reflects upon the worldwide terrorism people of the western world must endure as their contribution to the crucial mission ahead, and calls attention to the varied terrorist networks that threaten today’s civilized societies.