This historical research study traces and analyzes the technological development and force deployment of US submarine-launched strategic nuclear ballistic missiles, and the evolution of their military missions - during and after the Cold War - from countervalue (civilian, political and economic targets) strategic deterrence to the wider range of strategic and theater-tactical nuclear/conventional military force targeting, characteristic of counterforce or warfighting capabilities. Scope of this study also includes: US nuclear ballistic missile submarine survivability against antisubmarine warfare operations, and the role of the US fleet ballistic missile force in current 21st Century regional and global military threat scenarios, and beyond.

This historical research study traces and analyzes the technological development and force deployment of US submarine-launched strategic nuclear ballistic missiles, and the evolution of their military missions - during and after the Cold War - from countervalue (civilian, political and economic targets) strategic deterrence to the wider range of strategic and theater-tactical nuclear/conventional military force targeting, characteristic of counterforce or warfighting capabilities. Scope of this study also includes: US nuclear ballistic missile submarine survivability against antisubmarine warfare operations, and the role of the US fleet ballistic missile force in current 21st Century regional and global military threat scenarios, and beyond.

This historical research study traces and analyzes the technological development and force deployment of US submarine-launched strategic nuclear ballistic missiles, and the evolution of their military missions - during and after the Cold War - from countervalue (civilian, political and economic targets) strategic deterrence to the wider range of strategic and theater-tactical nuclear/conventional military force targeting, characteristic of counterforce or warfighting capabilities. Scope of this study also includes: US nuclear ballistic missile submarine survivability against antisubmarine warfare operations, and the role of the US fleet ballistic missile force in current 21st Century regional and global military threat scenarios, and beyond.

Dr. Berg P. Hyacinthe (PhD, Florida State University; LLD Candidate, Assas School of Law, CERSA-CNRS, La Sorbonne) is internationally recognized as an eminent and multidisciplinary scientific investigator. A U.S. patent holder featured in Harvard’s Smithsonian/NASA Astrophysics Data System, Dr. Hyacinthe recently served as Assistant Professor and Scientific Advisor to Taibah University’s Strategic Science & Advanced Technology Unit. Dr. Hyacinthe held several positions at County and State levels of the U.S Government in the Information Technology arena. He has been featured in conferences held at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (author); Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham (invited session Chair); and National Defence College, Helsinki (session Chair). In CYBER WARRIORS AT WAR, he draws on the triangular relationship between technology, law, and Information Age warfare to propose solutions against potential charges of having committed Information Operations (IO) war crimes and/or IO crimes against humanity. According to Dr. Hyacinthe, the success of pre-emptive strikes and decisive military operations depends profoundly upon both reliable human intelligence and the versatile skills of 21st century “cyber warriors” whose IO activities are conducted through modern warfare’s pentagonal synchrony – land, sea, air, cyberspace, and outer space. Unfortunately, these operations are commonly effectuated under a legal reasoning that is ambiguous in important ways: a threat to the national security of the United States of America and to the entire international community. Hence, as this Essay argues, the evolution of modern computer systems as weapons of war compels wary jurists to turn to the laws that should govern development and use of lethal information technologies. Further, this Essay examines how certain military operations within Information Warfare (IW) require new legal framework, and recounts specific events involving various types of IW conduct and cyber attack: an interesting exposé to jurists, military personnel, policymakers, and the growing and diverse body of information professionals around the world.

Dr. Berg P. Hyacinthe (PhD, Florida State University; LLD Candidate, Assas School of Law, CERSA-CNRS, La Sorbonne) is internationally recognized as an eminent and multidisciplinary scientific investigator. A U.S. patent holder featured in Harvard’s Smithsonian/NASA Astrophysics Data System, Dr. Hyacinthe recently served as Assistant Professor and Scientific Advisor to Taibah University’s Strategic Science & Advanced Technology Unit. Dr. Hyacinthe held several positions at County and State levels of the U.S Government in the Information Technology arena. He has been featured in conferences held at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (author); Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham (invited session Chair); and National Defence College, Helsinki (session Chair). In CYBER WARRIORS AT WAR, he draws on the triangular relationship between technology, law, and Information Age warfare to propose solutions against potential charges of having committed Information Operations (IO) war crimes and/or IO crimes against humanity. According to Dr. Hyacinthe, the success of pre-emptive strikes and decisive military operations depends profoundly upon both reliable human intelligence and the versatile skills of 21st century “cyber warriors” whose IO activities are conducted through modern warfare’s pentagonal synchrony – land, sea, air, cyberspace, and outer space. Unfortunately, these operations are commonly effectuated under a legal reasoning that is ambiguous in important ways: a threat to the national security of the United States of America and to the entire international community. Hence, as this Essay argues, the evolution of modern computer systems as weapons of war compels wary jurists to turn to the laws that should govern development and use of lethal information technologies. Further, this Essay examines how certain military operations within Information Warfare (IW) require new legal framework, and recounts specific events involving various types of IW conduct and cyber attack: an interesting exposé to jurists, military personnel, policymakers, and the growing and diverse body of information professionals around the world.

Dr. Berg P. Hyacinthe (PhD, Florida State University; LLD Candidate, Assas School of Law, CERSA-CNRS, La Sorbonne) is internationally recognized as an eminent and multidisciplinary scientific investigator. A U.S. patent holder featured in Harvard’s Smithsonian/NASA Astrophysics Data System, Dr. Hyacinthe recently served as Assistant Professor and Scientific Advisor to Taibah University’s Strategic Science & Advanced Technology Unit. Dr. Hyacinthe held several positions at County and State levels of the U.S Government in the Information Technology arena. He has been featured in conferences held at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (author); Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham (invited session Chair); and National Defence College, Helsinki (session Chair). In CYBER WARRIORS AT WAR, he draws on the triangular relationship between technology, law, and Information Age warfare to propose solutions against potential charges of having committed Information Operations (IO) war crimes and/or IO crimes against humanity. According to Dr. Hyacinthe, the success of pre-emptive strikes and decisive military operations depends profoundly upon both reliable human intelligence and the versatile skills of 21st century “cyber warriors” whose IO activities are conducted through modern warfare’s pentagonal synchrony – land, sea, air, cyberspace, and outer space. Unfortunately, these operations are commonly effectuated under a legal reasoning that is ambiguous in important ways: a threat to the national security of the United States of America and to the entire international community. Hence, as this Essay argues, the evolution of modern computer systems as weapons of war compels wary jurists to turn to the laws that should govern development and use of lethal information technologies. Further, this Essay examines how certain military operations within Information Warfare (IW) require new legal framework, and recounts specific events involving various types of IW conduct and cyber attack: an interesting exposé to jurists, military personnel, policymakers, and the growing and diverse body of information professionals around the world.

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The origin of this book lies in a program sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to explore innovative technologies with the potential to catalyze a revolutionary change in command and control (C2), specifically joint aerospace operations: the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) program.

The JFACC program was initiated in 1996, under an original charter of developing technologies for assisting in the rapid, semi-automated construction of a fully delineated, cross-functional air campaign plan. After less than two years of using then-current AI techniques in planning and scheduling, the program decided to abandon this more traditional approach, and in late 1999 adopted a new technical direction. Led by Program Manager Colonel Dan McCorry, USAF, the program recreated itself under the following hypothesis: Control Theory and its supporting technologies have developed sufficiently to be applicable to problems in military C2. It is upon the results of this latter phase of the JFACC program that this book is based.

A goal of this book is to present the potential military utility of control engineering in a way that the non-specialist can understand and evaluate. We chose to adopt a style that is neither a collection of technical papers nor an entirely non-technical discussion, resulting in a book that does not require a specialist's background and yet provides a significant measure of technical content. We avoid jargon and formalism, and focus instead on how the technology will work in practice-its limitations and dependencies, as well as its utility and value.

The origin of this book lies in a program sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to explore innovative technologies with the potential to catalyze a revolutionary change in command and control (C2), specifically joint aerospace operations: the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) program.

The JFACC program was initiated in 1996, under an original charter of developing technologies for assisting in the rapid, semi-automated construction of a fully delineated, cross-functional air campaign plan. After less than two years of using then-current AI techniques in planning and scheduling, the program decided to abandon this more traditional approach, and in late 1999 adopted a new technical direction. Led by Program Manager Colonel Dan McCorry, USAF, the program recreated itself under the following hypothesis: Control Theory and its supporting technologies have developed sufficiently to be applicable to problems in military C2. It is upon the results of this latter phase of the JFACC program that this book is based.

A goal of this book is to present the potential military utility of control engineering in a way that the non-specialist can understand and evaluate. We chose to adopt a style that is neither a collection of technical papers nor an entirely non-technical discussion, resulting in a book that does not require a specialist's background and yet provides a significant measure of technical content. We avoid jargon and formalism, and focus instead on how the technology will work in practice-its limitations and dependencies, as well as its utility and value.